The Arakan Army (AA) represents one of the most formidable ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) currently challenging the central military authority in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Established in 2009, the AA advocates for the interests of the Rakhine ethnic group, historically referred to as the Arakanese, residing in Rakhine State on the Bay of Bengal coast. The organization’s mandate is rooted in historical grievances, primarily demanding enhanced political autonomy, equitable resource distribution, and formal recognition of the Rakhine identity within a prospective federal democratic structure for Myanmar. The AA’s continued ascendancy is fundamentally a symptom of protracted central misrule, reflecting the political necessity for ethnic communities to establish parallel systems of self-governance and survival.
The AA has demonstrably transitioned from a nascent insurgent unit to a formidable military and political entity, especially in the volatile post-2021 coup environment. Current estimates indicate that the AA commands an operational force ranging from 30,000 to 40,000 professional fighters, making it one of the largest EAOs. The organization has cultivated a sophisticated command structure and significantly expanded its operational footprint beyond the traditional zones in Rakhine State, extending influence into contiguous areas of Chin and Kachin States. The AA’s initial training was secured under the auspices of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The group’s subsequent ascent has been strategically underpinned by its participation in the “Brotherhood Alliance,” which also includes the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). This alliance has enabled coordinated offensives against the military junta, significantly weakening central control across Myanmar’s ethnic peripheries.
The strength of the Arakan Army is derived not solely from external resources, but from substantial and sustained local popular support within Rakhine society. This deep-seated backing is a direct result of decades of systematic political marginalization and economic exclusion under successive central regimes. Crucially, the AA has strategically positioned itself as a governing authority, not just a military force. It has implemented parallel administrative structures, educational services, and local judicial systems in areas of Rakhine State that fall outside the direct control of the central military junta. This effort to provide essential services and governance fills a vacuum left by the collapse of central administration and reinforces the AA’s legitimacy among the Rakhine population, effectively transforming its areas of influence into a de facto autonomous region.
The operational environment is critically complicated by the status of the Rohingya Muslim minority. While historical relations between the Buddhist-majority Rakhine and the Rohingya have been characterized by communal tension, recent AA rhetoric has suggested a potential willingness to coexist with the Rohingya population under a future negotiated federal framework. However, the Amnesty International report of September 2025 warns that the reality on the ground makes any attempt at refugee repatriation “catastrophic.” For many Rohingya, the AA has effectively “replaced the Myanmar military as their oppressor.” Communities face severe restrictions on movement, discriminatory livelihood bans (such as fishing), and continue to be subjected to forced labor for military purposes. Furthermore, the AA is documented as denying Rohingya identity by referring to them only as “Bengalis” or “Muslims.” This continued lack of protection and denial of basic rights means the situation remains highly volatile and requires extreme caution from the international community.
The AA’s rise cannot be separated from the consistent authoritarian impulse of the Bamar-dominated central power. The military’s conduct, notably during the operations against the Rohingya between 2016 and 2017, illustrated the systematic sidelining of ethnic political concerns and the imposition of stringent restrictions on international access. This history of centralized control over the humanitarian imperative is a longstanding precedent. It was clearly evident in 2008 when I worked with an international NGO following Cyclone Nargis, where the military junta imposed strict controls on expatriate workers, restricting movement outside Yangon and closely monitoring relief convoys under the guise of “national security.” This pattern of state control over compassionate action was repeated years later, when attempts to travel to Rakhine to work there as a humanitarian during the 2016-2017 period were met with government visa refusal. That denial confirmed how tightly controlled and opaque the conflict theatre in Rakhine had become, sealed from international scrutiny.
The trajectory of the AA’s influence presents a dual risk: it may either contribute constructively to the establishment of a genuinely inclusive federal union or, conversely, exacerbate the current fragmentation of the political landscape, particularly if its current governance structures fail to embrace the diversity of Rakhine State, as evidenced by the treatment of the Rohingya. The resolution of the protracted crisis in Myanmar is contingent upon the establishment of mutual trust between the central governing institutions and ethnic stakeholders, a confidence that has been systematically destroyed by the rulers of Myanmar over decades. Until that fundamental trust is rebuilt, the guns of the Arakan Army and other ethnic forces will continue to speak louder than any prospects for unified governance.
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